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SENATE TERMINATION OF PRESIDENTIAL RECESS 
APPOINTMENTS† 
Seth Barrett Tillman* 
To a fair-minded person assessing the broad ramparts of American 
constitutional scholarship, it is striking how little attention legal scholars 
and public intellectuals pay to the text of the United States Constitution.  
The document is a mystery to many of them.  Mostly they concern them-
selves with prior judicial decisions.  If a clause is not litigated, it is, as 
Judge Posner put it, off their ―radar screen.‖1  Even where a particular con-
stitutional provision is the subject of litigation, the judicial opinions almost 
invariably lead to scholarship assessing the propriety of the decision, as op-
posed to still-open aspects of the clause’s meaning.  Thus the history of our 
legal scholarship leads to an ever narrowing legal imagination, with the rhe-
toric of debate escalating over constantly declining intellectual stakes.   
But as citizens and lawyers interested in policy reform, including the 
institutional reform of our governing bodies, we should not limit ourselves 
to these narrow disputes.  The whole of the Constitution is within our grasp, 
if we would but seize it.  And, even today, the Constitution remains chock-
full of unused (and therefore judicially untested and unapproved) powers 
whose potential might be used, or, at least, explored.2 
One such power is the power of a Senate majority3 to terminate a pres-
idential recess appointment.  The Recess Appointments Clause, Article II, 
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1
  RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
THE COURTS 205 (2001) (―[A] constitutional problem, however serious, that does not leave its traces in 
the pages of the United States Reports is unlikely to appear on the academic radar screen.‖). 
2
  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V (permitting the States to call a national convention for proposing 
amendments to the Constitution, a power never utilized to this day) (link). 
3
  In this brief article I do not address the interplay between the proposed procedural reform and the 
Senate filibuster rule which requires a supermajority to terminate debate.  See SENATE RULE XXII 
(2007), available at http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule22.php (link). 
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The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during 
the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the 
End of their next Session. 
Certain aspects of this clause have been adjudicated and are much dis-
cussed in the academic literature.  For example, it has been questioned 
whether this power extends to the President’s making appointments to the 
Article III courts,4 whether the President can make a recess appointment af-
ter the Senate has returned from its recess to an office which had become 
vacant during (or prior to) the recess,5 and whether the President can make a 
recess appointment during a recess to a statutory office that had never be-
fore been filled.6  These debates uniformly go to the limits of the President’s 
power to appoint under the terms of the clause.  There is no discussion of 
any concomitant removal power—it is just assumed that the removal power 
(wherever it is vested) with regard to recess appointments is coextensive 
with the removal power generally.  This short article seeks to test that as-
sumption. 
*     *     * 
As stated, the text of the Recess Appointments Clause provides that 
such appointments last until the end of the Senate’s next session.  The Ex-
ecutive Branch has also made this clear.7  I suggest that, after the President 
makes a valid recess appointment, the Senate could convene, immediately 
terminate its session, and then reconvene instantly.8  The Senate would en-
ter its adjournment order on its journal and notify the President by message 





  See William Ty Mayton, Recess Appointments and an Independent Judiciary, 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 515, 542, 552–53 (2004) (generally arguing that the power of the President to make a tem-
porary judicial recess appointment should give way to the right of litigants to be free from appointments 
subject to domination by the political branches) (link). 
5
  See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA 
L. REV. 1487, 1538–40 (2005) (doubting the constitutionality of the practice) (link). 
6
  See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 3, 1799), in 23 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 94 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1976) (noting that ―[v]acancy is a relative term, and 
presupposes that the Office has been once filled‖) (emphasis omitted). 
7
  See Gaillard Hunt, The History of the Department of State, 5 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 414, 424–25 
(1911) (reprinting President George Washington’s commission of Supreme Court Justice Thomas John-
son, which stated that the recess appointment lasted ―during his good behaviour, and until the end of the 
next session of the Senate of the United States, and no longer‖); fax from Federal Judicial Center to Seth 
Barrett Tillman (Jan. 3, 2007) (reproducing President George W. Bush’s commission of Judge William 
H. Pryor Jr., which stated that the recess appointment lasted ―until the end of the next session of the Se-
nate of the United States and no longer; subject to the provisions of law‖) (on file with the Northwestern 
University Law Review) (link). 
8
  This strategy will only work for an intersession recess appointment.  An intrasession recess ap-
pointment, i.e., an appointment made during an adjournment within a given session, lasts the remainder 
of that session and additionally for the life of the next session.  Thus, if the President has made an intra-
session recess appointment, then the Senate will have to convene and terminate two ―sessions‖ back-to-
back in order to terminate the President’s intrasession appointment. 
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quence.  But it is precisely on such fictions that the Executive Branch has 
justified contentious prior appointments.  For example, President Theodore 
Roosevelt took the position that even when the prior Congress met until the 
last moment of its constitutional term and the successor Congress convened 
immediately thereafter, that interregnum of one moment was a ―recess‖ 
permitting the President to make a constitutionally valid recess appoint-
ment.9   
The termination of the Senate’s (post-recess) session should terminate 
the appointment—along with any other recess appointments made by the 
President over the course of the recess.  The Senate could not pick and 
choose which individual appointees would ―survive‖ termination—it would 
have to choose between terminating all the recess appointments or none of 
them.  And where the Senate objects to intrasession appointments as a mat-
ter of constitutional principle, then the Senate should not be permitted, as a 
normative matter, to pick and choose which appointments survive termina-
tion and which do not.  On the other hand, where only one appointment was 
made during the recess, the Senate would have no need to pick and choose. 
There are a few potential problems with the proposed stratagem. 
First, it is new.  Thus, although it seems consistent with the Constitu-
tion’s text, it does not (yet) have judicial approval.  But then again, Mar-
bury v. Madison10 occupies more than forty pages in the official reporter, 
and Marbury only has a lone citation to a prior (foreign) judicial decision, 
and for an obscure point, not central to its celebrated holding relating to 
judicial review.11  My point is only that sometimes, when the text is reason-
ably clear, simple textual interpretation, even absent supporting precedent, 
is a legitimate method of constitutional interpretation. 
Second, it could be argued that the word ―Session‖ in the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause refers not to whatever the Senate chooses to designate as 
a Session, but rather to a year-long period in which the Senate sits, regard-
less of adjournments, recesses, or other breaks.  If this were true, then the 
Senate could not decide that a ―Session‖ was over solely by taking a vote.  
However, although the term session is associated in the popular mind with 





  See Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Article III Judges: Three Constitutional Ques-
tions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 377, 416–18 (2005) (describing President Roosevelt’s contested appoint-
ment) (link); see also Michael A. Carrier, Note, When is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess 
Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2228, 2247 (1994) (arguing that presidential authority 
extends to intersession recesses, not to ―fictional‖ or ―constructive‖ recesses between back-to-back 
meetings of the Senate). 
10
  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (link).  
11
  Id. at 168–69 (quoting Rex v. Barker, 3 Burr. 1265, 1266 (1762), although erroneously giving the 
case name as ―Baker‖). 
12
  See Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1565 (acknowledging that Congress could have multiple sessions 
in a calendar year); but see Carrier, supra note 9, at 2218, 2223 (arguing that the founders ―anticipated‖ 
one session and one intersession recess each year).  Carrier does not argue that the expectation was em-
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does the Constitution prescribe or even assume fixed annual sessions, al-
though the Constitution commands that the Congress should meet at least 
once annually.13  Thus, the Senate is free to depart from the expectation of 
distinct annual sessions.  Historically, some years have had multiple ses-
sions14 and arguably a session can last multiple years15—at least up to two 
years for reasons of comity with the House’s election cycle.  In other words, 
there is no such thing as a ―full year’s session‖ unless the Senate stays in 
session a full year. 
Third, it is not clear that the Senate, acting alone, can terminate its ses-
sion and then instantly reconvene, at least absent concurrence from the 
House.  As a textual matter it appears that the decision is one for the Senate 
alone to make.
16
  There are some good reasons to believe that where, as 
here, the adjournment is for less than three days, each house controls its 
sessional agenda
17
 and its journal
18
 independent of the other house.  Moreo-
ver, one recent commentator on legislative procedure has taken the position 
that the Constitution embodies cameral autonomy as a structural norm.
19
  
There are also historical
20
 and textual arguments for believing the President 
simply plays no role (or next to no role
21
) in decision-making involving the 
                                                                                                                           
bodied in the text.   
13
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 (link).  
14
  See infra note 20. 
15
  Indeed, given the modern practice of carrying over sessional business between sessions within a 
given two-year Congress, arguably there is only one session (in the constitutional sense) every two 
years.  See SENATE RULE XVIII (2007), available at http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule18.php 
(link); CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 1085 (Aug. 14, 1848) (passing the progenitor of current Se-
nate Rule XVIII that was proposed by Senator Webster) (link); THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF 
PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § 51 (2d ed. 1818) (explaining that all matters ―before Parliament were dis-
continued by the determination of the session‖). 
16
  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (permitting recess appointments during the ―Recess of the Se-
nate,‖ not the ―recess of the Congress‖) (link); but see id. at art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (referring to the ―Session of 
Congress‖) (link).   
17
  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (―Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without 
the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days . . . .‖) (emphasis added) (link).  
18
  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (―Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings . . . .‖) 
(emphasis added) (link).  
19
  See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judicial Confirmation Process is Broken, Can a Statute Fix 
It?, 85 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (link).    
20
  For example, the First Congress over the course of its two years had three regular sessions, exclu-
sive of any sessions called by the President and of any Senate executive sessions.  All the relevant deci-
sions, i.e., when to adjourn and when to reconvene, were made by concurrent resolutions, absent 
presidential participation, impliedly establishing that the number of sessions is within Congress’ exclu-
sive control.  See, e.g., 1 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 130 
(Washington, Gales & Seaton 1826) (Sept. 29, 1789) (adjourning first session to a day certain opening 
second session) (link); id. at 298 (Aug. 12, 1790) (adjourning second session to day certain opening 
third session) (link).  Although this goes some way to establish that the President plays no role, it does 
not establish that the two houses must act in concert.  Bicameral action may have been taken for reasons 
of comity or only because each recess was for more than three days.  See supra note 17.   
21
  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 (making first Monday in December the default date for the an-
nual meeting of Congress unless changed by statute) (link), amended by id. at amend. XX (changing 
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Senate’s decision to recess and to reconvene.  For example, the Orders, 
Resolutions, and Votes (―ORV‖) Clause provides: 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and 
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Ad-
journment) shall be presented to the President . . . .
22
 
The traditional view of the ORV Clause is that it exempts the President 
from participating in (by signing or by vetoing) bicameral congressional 
adjournment resolutions.23  If this view is correct, then that is an additional 
and powerful reason to believe that the President does not participate in bi-
cameral decisions to go into recess.24  Whether the Senate can terminate and 
reconvene on its own (as I believe it can), or whether such a move requires 
concurrence of the House, the President is not part of such decision-making.  
Thus, either the Senate acting alone or the two houses acting collectively 
can terminate a presidential recess appointment.  If either view is correct, 
that would represent a sea-change in our current recess appointment prac-
tices.  And, for reasons that I explain below, this change would be benefi-
cial although it admittedly might upset current expectations and reliance 
interests. 
*     *     * 
It is generally believed that the purpose of the Recess Appointments 
Clause is to see to it that the administration of government does not suffer 
―due to a vacancy in office left unfilled while the Senate is dispersed and 
unavailable during its recess.‖25  Thus, the Recess Appointments Clause is a 
second best compelled by circumstances, i.e., an unexpected vacancy that 
needs to be filled at a time the Senate is unavailable.  The best solution is, 
of course, presidential nomination in tandem with Senate advice and con-
sent.  The procedure outlined in this article would give the President a 
strong incentive to make recess appointments that would withstand Senate 
                                                                                                                           
date to January 3) (link).  The fact that Congress must meet on January 3 every year does not mandate, 
at least as a textual matter, Congress taking a recess prior to that date or starting a new session on that 
date.   
22
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (emphasis added) (link). 
23
  See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 54-1335, at 1–2, 8 (1897) (taking the position that the subject matter of the 
ORV Clause is bicameral resolutions) (link); see also Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1558–59 (taking the 
position that the ORV Clause’s parenthetical is tied to Article I, Section 5, Clause 4, and thus both refer 
to bicameral adjournment resolutions); but see Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, 
Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was 
Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1347–49 (2005) (urging a contrary view, albeit one that, like 
the traditional view, supports the position taken in the text of this article) (link). 
24
  See supra note 20; cf. Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1569 (―Congress can choose to have recesses 
during a session of whatever length it determines.  Moreover, Congress can end a session at its discre-
tion . . . .‖). 
25
  Mayton, supra note 4, at 516; see also Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1224 & n.5 (11th Cir. 
2004) (link). 
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advice and consent, even if the President does not put the candidate forward 
on a ―permanent‖ basis following the reassembly of the Senate.  If the Pres-
ident during a recess appoints a person that is not supported by a majority in 
the Senate, the Senate could terminate the appointment when it reassem-
bles.  (And, where empowered under preexisting rules, the majority leader 
might call an earlier than scheduled meeting of the Senate to displace an 
appointee the majority actively opposes.) 
One might believe that this policy reform weakens the hand of the 
President vis-à-vis the Senate.  It would certainly temper and moderate their 
choices, and whether or not that is a good thing will depend largely on who 
is elected to the Senate and who is elected to the presidency.  But the more 
important effect of this policy will be to make the Senate responsible to the 
electorate.  The Senate would no longer be able to shift responsibility for 
appointments onto the President merely by going into recess.  Similarly, the 
Senate could not escape responsibility to the public by saying the Presi-
dent’s appointment is final until the Senate’s next fixed or scheduled ses-
sion ends.  The Senate would no longer be able to play a role by mere 
inaction—as they have too often done in the advice and consent process.  
Rather, to turn out the President’s nominee, the Senate will have to affirma-
tively vote26 to terminate their session upon reassembling at the end of the 
recess.27  If they refuse to exercise this power, they could be held accounta-
ble by the voters. 
Thus, the Senate has the constitutional power to terminate presidential 
recess appointments by a majority vote, although perhaps the consent of the 
House of Representatives is also needed, at least in some cases.  The sug-
gested procedural innovation might have a beneficial policy result:  increas-
ing the Senate’s responsibility to the electorate.  I admit that this latter 
prediction on my part is just a prediction, and that such policy considera-
tions certainly do not control the original public meaning of the Constitu-
tion’s text.  But perhaps this sort of argument offers some comfort to those 
afraid of institutional change.  In other words, the winner here is not the Se-





  As in baseball, where ties go to the runner, Senate ties (absent unlikely vice-presidential interven-
tion) will leave the President’s appointee in place. 
27
  Of course, an incumbent majority could automate this process by rule, so that after returning from 
each and every recess, the Senate automatically terminates its session and instantly reassembles. 
